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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses a new leximetric dataset on Indian labour law over a long period 
1970-2006. There are five broad aspects of labour law such as Alternative employment 
contracts, Regulation of working time, Regulation of dismissal, Employee representation 
and Industrial action.  Indian labour regulation is more concerned with the regulation of 
dismissal. It is more pro-labour than any of the four major OECD countries such as 
France, Germany, UK and USA.  There is no evidence that more labour friendly 
regulation leads to more unemployment and industrial stagnation. Rather the direction of 
causality is from unemployment and output to labour regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The regulation of labour market to protect the interest of labour is often taken as an 
exogenous interference with market relations causing a reduction in employment and 
productivity.  During the era of Reaganomics and Thatcherism in the 1980s, USA and 
UK underwent a process of labour market deregulation (along with other things) and 
subsequently it has become the essential part of ‘Washington Consensus’-IMF-World 
Bank policy package prescribed to the crisis-stricken  less developed countries.   
 
In the late 1990s La Porta and his collaborators (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 
2006, 2008; Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Beck et al., 2003a, 
2003b; Botero et al., 2004) set in motion a series of systematic analysis of the 
relationships between legal and economic variables.  Legal variables (‘leximetric’ data) 
are by and large binary variables (0, 1) used to quantify the quality of various types of 
law that exist in different countries to protect the interests of various stakeholders such as 
shareholders, creditors and labourers. The countries are classified according to their 
‘legal origin’: English common law and civil law are two broad categories. Through 
various cross-section regression studies of these ‘leximetric’ data, it is argued that 
English common law systems are more market-friendly; they provide higher level of 
shareholder and creditor protection to promote financial development. It is also pointed 
out that the civil law countries interfere more in the labour market which exerts a 
negative impact on employment and productivity.   
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A similar viewpoint can be found in IMF (2003). The IMF called for the deregulation of 
European labour markets and argued that reforms intended to bring European labour laws 
into lines with those of the US would cut unemployment by over a third. The OECD has 
maintained the view that the deregulatory approach of its 1994 Jobs Strategy (OECD, 
1994) retains ‘plausibility’ (OECD, 2004: 165).  The World Bank’s Doing Business 
Report stated that ‘laws created to protect workers often hurt them’ and that ‘more 
flexible labour regulations boost job creation’ (World Bank, 2008: 19).   
 
This World Bank view (‘laws created to protect workers often hurt them’) was supported 
by Besley and Burgess (2004) in the context of India. They showed that that Indian 
provinces (‘states ‘) which enacted pro-labour regulation experienced lowered output, 
employment, investment, and productivity in registered or formal manufacturing.  The 
work of Bhattacharjea (2006) strongly refuted their arguments. 
 
In this perspective, we shall study Indian labour law and its unemployment consequence 
on the basis of a new dataset available from the source of Centre for Business Research, 
CBR (University of Cambridge, UK) over a long time span 1970-2006.1  Availability of 
such a long continuous leximetric data provides us an opportunity to use more 
sophisticated econometric technique to address the causality issue (without relying on 
casual empiricism based on scattered evidence).  In the next section we shall first discuss 
the changing pattern of the various aspects of labour regulation in India over the whole 
                                                 
1
  CBR data on labour regulations are available for five countries: four OECD countries 
(UK, USA, France and Germany) and India over a long time span, 1970-2006. 
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period (1970-2006) for which the CBR data are available.  In section 3 we shall examine 
the impact of labour regulations on the state of unemployment. 
 
2.  Indian Labour Regulation: A Leximetric Study 
 
CBR data on labour regulation index consists of 40 variables (numbered 1 to 40 – see 
Table 1 for details). Each variable assumes the value between 0 (least labour-friendly) 
and 1 (most labour-friendly). This dataset is available for 5 countries (France, Germany, 
UK, USA and India) over the period 1970-2006.  We are analysing here Indian data. 
 
Examining the data at the variable-level, we find that India experienced changes only in 9 
variables (in all cases only once).  So the variability of the labour regulation index is 
accounted for by these nine variables.  Simple average of these nine variables is plotted 
along with the simple average of the 40 variables in Figure 1.  Evidently the changes are 
not frequent. Over the 37 year period (1970-2006), changes in the regulation took place 
in the following six years: 1971, 1974, 1976, 1984, 1985 and 1998.  
 
Out of the 9 variables only one declined (became less pro-labour). This is the law relating 
to political industrial action – whether strikes over political (i.e. non-work related) issues 
are permitted (variable 33). It becomes the most stringent in 1998 (it got the score 0 
during 1998-2005 from the earlier period score 0.5).   
 
Eight other variables improved (became more pro-labour):  
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1. Variable 7 concerning the prohibition of the use of agency labour – it rose from 0 to 
0.5 in 1974; 
2. Variable 8 concerning equal treatment of agency workers rose from 0 to 0.5 in 1974; 
3. Variable 16 concerning the legally mandated notice period for all dismissals of the 
workers with 3 years of employment attains the perfect score 1 (12 weeks’ notice for 
dismissal) in 1976 from 0.33 (3 weeks’ notice) ; 
4. Variable 20 concerning constraint on dismissal improved from 0 to 0.33 in 1971; 
5. Variable 21 concerning reinstatement remedy for unfair dismissal improved from 0.33 
(compensation is the normal remedy) to 0.67 (reinstatement and compensation are, de 
jure and de facto, alternative remedies) in 1971; 
6. Variable 22 regarding notification of dismissal improved from 0.67 (third party or a 
state body has to be notified prior to dismissal) to 1 (the employer has to obtain the 
permission of a state body or third party prior to dismissal) in 1976. 
7. Variable 27 concerning employers’ duty to bargain rose from 0 (the employers may 
lawfully refuse to bargain with workers) to 0.5 (moderate legal binding to bargain) in 
1984. 
8. Variable 40 regarding replacement of striking workers attained the perfect score (law 
prohibits employers to fire striking workers or to hire replacement labour to maintain the 
plant in operation during a non-violent and non-political strike) in 1985 from the 
minimum score (no prohibition). 
 
Out of 30 variables showing no change, seven variables attained the perfect score 1: 
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Variable 1 concerning the legal status of the worker (law mandates the employee status, 
if certain conditions are met), Variable 6 regarding the maximum duration of fixed term 
contracts (one year  is the maximum duration of fixed term contract which is deemed to 
be  permanent), Variable 11 concerning overtime premium (it is double), Variable 19 
concerning the procedural constraints on dismissal (dismissal is necessarily unjust if the 
employer fails to follow procedural requirements prior to dismissal), Variable 23 
concerning redundancy selection (by law employer must follow priority rules based on 
seniority etc prior to dismissing for redundancy), Variable 24 regarding priority in re-
employment (by law employer must follow priority rules relating to the re-employment 
of the former workers) and  Variable 34 concerning sympathetic strike action (there are 
no constraints on secondary or sympathy strike action). Subsequently three more 
variables attained that perfect score (variables 16, 22 and 40 already mentioned). 
 
Six variables remained at the minimum possible score (zero):  
 
Variable 12 concerning weekend working (no premium for weekend working), Variable 
13 concerning limits to overtime working (no limit), Variable 26 regarding collective 
bargaining (no entry in the constitution), Variable 29 regarding closed shop (neither pre-
entry nor post-entry closed shops are permitted to operate), Variable 30 regarding board 
membership (no legal right of the unions and/or workers to nominate board-level 
directors) and Variable 36 concerning right to industrial action incorporated in the 
constitution (no such constitutional right).   
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The 40 variables are broadly categorized into 5 components: regulations concerning 
alternative employment contracts (variables 1 to 8), regulation of working time (variables 
9 to 15), regulation of dismissal (variables 16 to 24), regulations relating to employee 
representation (variables 25 to 31) and industrial action (variables 32 to 40).   
 
In terms of  the broad categories, we find that regulations concerning alternative 
employment contact (variables 1 to 8)  changed for the better once in 1974; similarly 
regulations relating to employee representation (variable 25 to 31) changed for the better 
once in 1984. The regulations relating to industrial action (variables 32 to 40) changed 
for the better in 1984 and worsened in 1998.  Regulation of working time (variables 9 to 
15) remained unchanged throughout the period of study. Regulation of dismissal 
(variables 16 to 24) is the most important element in Indian labour regulation; it becomes 
more and more labour-friendly (see Figure 2). Compared to four other countries Indian 
labour regulation concerning dismissal is more labour-friendly (see Figure 3). 
 
3.  Labour Regulation and Unemployment: A Study of Causality 
 
Now the question is: is there causal impact of labour regulation on unemployment during 
1970-2006. To answer this question we have collected data on registered unemployment 
(number of people in live unemployment resister) from the source of RBI (Reserve Bank 
of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy –available online). To control for the 
state of the economy - especially the organized sector, we have used real output of the  
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Very Convenient Location industrial sector - India’s industrial output (at 1999-2000 
prices) collected from the same RBI source.  
 
As a first step towards the study of relationships among these variables we have to follow 
the standard practice of conducting the unit root test.  That is to say we have to examine 
the order of integration – how many times the data are to be differenced to achieve 
stationarity. Our ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests show that all the series are I (1) –
integrated of order 1 – first-difference stationary (Table 2).  
 
In view of the non-stationarity in the series the standard regression analysis of the 
variables in level terms is misleading. We have to go for cointegration analysis. Various 
tests of cointegration (Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue) are done - these support that the 
three variables are cointegrated - that is to say meaningful long-term relationships  exist 
between them (Table 3). 
 
To ascertain the nature of short-term adjustment process leading to long-term 
relationships we have estimated three possible VEC (Vector Error Correction) models - 
estimates are reported in Table 4.  On the basis of the VEC models we undertake Granger 
causality test to ascertain the direction of causality (Table 5). These show one meaningful 
relationship (model 1 in Table 4) - labour regulation has a short-term negative 
relationship with unemployment and there exists a stable adjustment path leading to a 
long-term negative relationship. That is to say, less unemployment leads to more labour 
friendly regulation.  
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We also find a positive effect of industrial output on labour-friendly regulation but the 
Granger causality tests tell that the arrow runs from the opposite direction -from labour-
friendly regulation to industrial growth. The VEC model (Model 3 of Table 4) shows a 
positive long-term impact of labour regulation and a negative long-term impact of 
unemployment on industrial output. The implication is that a more labour-friendly 
regulation pushes up industrial output and less unemployment increases industrial 
production (perhaps due to demand-pull). However, the adjustment path from the short-
term to long-term relationship is not significantly stable discounting the importance of 
these observations. There is, however, no evidence that more labour friendly regulation 
leads to more unemployment (as per the findings of Model 2 of Table 4 and causality test 
results reported in Table 5).  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines Indian labour law and its unemployment consequence on the basis 
of a new dataset available from the source of Centre for Business Research, CBR 
(University of Cambridge, UK) over a long time span 1970-2006.  There are five broad 
aspects of labour law such as Alternative employment contracts, Regulation of working 
time, Regulation of dismissal, Employee representation and Industrial action.  Indian 
labour regulation is more concerned with the regulation of dismissal. It is more pro-
labour than any of the four major OECD countries such as France, Germany, UK and 
USA.   
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After describing the trend and pattern of Indian labour regulation, this paper examines the 
causal impact of labour regulation on unemployment. Availability of such a long 
continuous leximetric data provides us an opportunity to use more sophisticated 
econometric technique - Vector Error Correction (VEC) model and VEC causality tests to 
address the causality issue (without relying on casual empiricism based on scattered 
evidence).  It finds no evidence that more labour friendly regulation leads to more 
unemployment and industrial stagnation. Thus it questions the conventional wisdom 
found in the phrases such as ‘laws created to protect workers often hurt them.’  
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Table 1. India’s Labour Regulation Index, 1970-2006: Different Components  
 
 
Variables ( Values and the Changes) Description 
A. Alternative employment contracts 
 
(0.5  during 1970-73, thereafter 0.63) 
Measures the cost of using alternatives to the ‘standard’ 
employment contract, computed as an average of the variables 1-
8. 
1. The law, as opposed to the contracting parties, 
determines the legal status of the worker 
 
(1 –no change) 
Equals 0 if the parties are free to stipulate that the relationship is 
one of self-employment as opposed to employee status; 0.5 if the 
law allows the issue of status to be determined by the nature of the 
contract made by the parties (as in the case of the English common 
law ‘mutuality of obligation’ test); and 1 if the law mandates 
employee status on the parties if certain specified criteria are met 
(such as form of payment, duration of hiring, etc.). 
 
Scope for scores between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 
of the law. 
2. Part-time workers have the right to equal treatment 
with full-time workers 
 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the legal system recognises a right to equal treatment 
for part-time workers (as, for example, in the case of EC Directive 
97/81/EC. 
 
Equals 0.5 if the legal system recognises a more limited right to 
equal treatment for part-time workers (via, e.g., sex discrimination 
law or a more general right of workers not be treated arbitrarily in 
employment). 
 
Equals 0 if neither of the above. 
 
Scope for scores between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 
of the law. 
3. The cost of dismissing part-time workers is equal in 
proportionate terms to the cost of dismissing full-time 
workers 
 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if as a matter of law part-time workers enjoy 
proportionate rights to  full-time workers in respect of dismissal 
protection (notice periods, severance pay and unjust dismissal 
protection). 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradation 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
4. Fixed-term contracts are allowed only for work of 
limited duration. 
 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the law imposes a substantive constraint on the 
conclusion of a fixed-term contract, by, for example, allowing 
temporary hirings only for jobs which are temporary by nature, 
training, seasonal work, replacement of workers on maternity or 
sick leave, or other specified reasons. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for gradation between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
5. Fixed-term workers have the right to equal treatment 
with permanent workers 
 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the legal system recognises a right to equal treatment 
for fixed-term workers (as, for example, in the case of EC 
Directive 99/70/EC). 
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Equals 0.5 if the legal system recognises a more limited right to 
equal treatment for fixed-term workers (via, e.g., more general 
right of workers not be treated arbitrarily in employment) 
 
Equals 0 if neither of the above. 
 
Scope for further gradation between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
6. Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts 
(1 –no change) 
Measures the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term 
contracts permitted by law before the employment is deemed to be 
permanent.  The score is normalised from 0 to 1, with higher 
values indicating a lower permitted duration.  The score equals 1 if 
the maximum limit is 1 year or less and 0 if it is 10 years or more 
or if there is no legal limit. 
7. Agency work is prohibited or strictly controlled 
 
(0 during 1970-73, thereafter 0.5) 
Equals 1 if the legal system prohibits the use of agency labour. 
 
Equals 0.5 if it places substantive constraints on its use (in the 
sense of allowing it only if certain conditions are satisified, such 
as a demonstrable need on the part of the employer to meet 
fluctuations in labour demand).   
 
Equals 0 if neither of the above. 
 
Scope for further gradation between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
8. Agency workers have the right to equal treatment with 
permanent workers of the user undertaking  
 
(0 during 1970-73, thereafter 0.5) 
Equals 1 if the legal system recognises a right to equal treatment 
for agency workers, in relation to permanent workers of the user 
undertaking, in respect of terms and conditions of employment in 
general 
 
Equals 0.5 or another intermediate score if the legal system 
recognises a more limited right to equal treatment for agency 
workers workers (for example, in respect of anti-discrimination 
law) 
 
Equals 0 if neither of the above. 
 
Scope for further gradation between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
B. Regulation of working time 
(0.39 –no change) 
Measures the regulation of working time, computed as an 
average of variables 9-15. 
9. Annual leave entitlements 
 
(0.5 –no change) 
Measures the normal length of annual paid leave guaranteed by 
law or collective agreement. The same score is given for laws and 
for collective agreements which are de facto binding on most of 
the workforce (as in the case of systems which have extension 
legislation for collective agreements).  The score is normalised on 
a 0-1 scale, with a leave entitlement of 30 days equivalent to a 
score of 1. 
10. Public holiday entitlements 
 
(0.28 –no change) 
Measures the normal number of paid public holidays guaranteed 
by law or collective agreement. The same score is given for laws 
and for collective agreements which are de facto binding on most 
of the workforce (as in the case of systems which have extension 
legislation for collective agreements).  The score is normalised on 
a 0-1 scale, with an entitlement of 18 days equivalent to a score of 
1. 
11. Overtime premia 
 
(1 –no change) 
Measures the normal premium for overtime working set by law or 
by collective agreements which are generally applicable.  The 
same score is given for laws and for collective agreements which 
are de facto binding on most of the workforce (as in the case of 
systems which have extension legislation for collective 
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agreements).   The score equals 1 if the normal premium is double 
time, 0.5 if it is time and half, and 0 is there is no premium. 
12. Weekend working  
 
(0 –no change) 
Measures the normal premium for weekend working set by law or 
by collective agreements which are generally applicable.  The 
same score is given for laws and for collective agreements which 
are de facto binding on most of the workforce (as in the case of 
systems which have extension legislation for collective 
agreements).   The score equals 1 if the normal premium is double 
time, 0.5 if it is time and half, and 0 is there is no premium.  Also 
equals 1 if weekend working is strictly controlled or prohibited. 
13. Limits to overtime working 
(0 –no change) 
Measures the maximum weekly number of overtime hours 
permitted by law or by collective agreements which are generally 
applicable.  The score equals 1 if there is a maximum duration to 
weekly working hours, inclusive of overtime, for normal 
employment; 0.5 if there is a limit but it may be averaged out over 
a reference period of longer than a week; and 0 if there is no limit 
on any kind.   
14. Duration of the normal working week 
 
(0.13 –no change) 
Measures the maximum duration of the normal working week 
exclusive of overtime. The score is normalised on a 0-1 scale with 
a limit of 35 hours or less scoring 1 and a limit of 50 hours or 
more, or no limit, scoring 0.  The same score is given for laws and 
for collective agreements which are de facto binding on most of 
the workforce (as in the case of systems which have extension 
legislation for collective agreements).    
15. Maximum daily working time 
 
(0 .85–no change) 
Measures the maximum number of permitted working hours in a 
day, taking account of rules governing  rest breaks and maximum 
daily working time limits.  The score is normalised on a 0-1 scale 
with a limit of 8 hours or less scoring 1 and a limit of 18 hours or 
more scoring 0. 
C. Regulation of dismissal 
(0.61 in 1970, 0.69 during 1971-75;0.8 thereafter) 
Measures the regulation of dismissal, calculated as the average 
of variables 16-24 
16. Legally mandated notice period (all dismissals) 
 
( 0.33 during 1970-75  and 1 thereafter) 
Measures the length of notice, in weeks, that has to be given to a 
worker with 3 years’ employment.  Normalise the score so that 0 
weeks = 0 and 12 weeks = 1. 
17. Legally mandated redundancy compensation 
(0.5 –no change) 
Measures the amount of redundancy compensation payable to a 
worker made redundant after 3 years of employment, measured in 
weeks of pay.  Normalise the score so that 0 weeks = 0 and 12 
weeks = 1. 
18. Minimum qualifying period of service for normal 
case of unjust dismissal 
(0.66 in 1970 thereafter 0.67) 
Measures the period of service required before a worker qualifies 
for general protection against unjust dismissal.  Normalise the 
score so that 3 years or more  = 0, 0 months = 1 
19. Law imposes procedural constraints on dismissal 
 
(1 –no change) 
Equals 1 if a dismissal is necessarily unjust if the employer fails to 
follow procedural requirements prior to dismissal 
 
Equals 0.67 if failure to follow procedural requirements will 
normally lead to a finding of unjust dismissal.   
 
Equals 0.33 if failure to follow procedural requirement is just one 
factor taken into account in unjust dismissal cases. 
 
Equals 0 if there are no procedural requirements for dismissal.   
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
20. Law imposes substantive constraints on dismissal 
 
(0 in 1970, 0.33 thereafter) 
Equals 1 if dismissal is only permissible for serious misconduct or 
fault of the employee. 
 
Equals 0.67 if dismissal is lawful according to a wider range of 
legitimate reasons (misconduct, lack of capability, redundancy, 
etc.).   
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Equals 0.33 if dismissal is permissible if it is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ as 
defined by case law. 
 
Equals 0 if employment is at will (i.e., no cause dismissal is 
normally permissible). 
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
 
21. Reinstatement normal remedy for unfair dismissal 
(0.33 in 1970, 0.67 thereafter) 
Equals 1 if reinstatement is the normal remedy for unjust dismissal 
and is regularly enforced. 
 
Equals 0.67 if reinstatement and compensation are, de iure and de 
facto, alternative remedies. 
 
Equals 0.33 if compensation is the normal remedy. 
 
Equals 0 if no remedy is available as of right. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
22. Notification of dismissal 
(0.67 during 1970-75, 1 thereafter) 
Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement the employer 
has to obtain the permission of a state body or third body prior to 
an individual dismissal. 
 
Equals 0.67 if a state body or third party has to be notified prior to 
the dismissal. 
 
Equals 0.33 if the employer has to give the worker written reasons 
for the dismissal.  
 
Equals 0 if an oral statement of dismissal to the worker suffices. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
23. Redundancy selection  
 
(1 –no change) 
Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement the employer 
must follow priority rules based on seniority, marital status, 
number or dependants, etc., prior to dismissing for redundancy. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
24. Priority in re-employment 
 
(1 –no change) 
Equals 1 if by law or binding collective agreement the employer 
must follow priority rules relating to the re-employment of former 
workers.   
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
  
D. Employee representation 
(0.2 during 1970-83, 0.27 thereafter) 
Measures the strength of employee representation, calculated as 
the average of variables 25-31. 
25. Right to unionisation 
 
(0 .33–no change) 
Measures the protection of the right to form trade unions in the 
country's constitution (loosely interpreted in the case of system 
such as the UK without a codified constitution).   
 
Equals 1 if a right to form trade unions is expressly granted by the 
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constitution.   
 
Equals 0.67 if trade unions are described in the constitution as a 
matter of public policy or public interest. 
 
Equals 0.33 if trade unions are otherwise mentioned in the 
constitution or there is a reference to freedom of association which 
encompasses trade unions. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
26. Right to collective bargaining 
 
(0 –no change) 
Measures the protection of the right to collective bargaining or the 
right to enter into collective agreements in the country's 
constitution (loosely interpreted in the case of system such as the 
UK without a codified constitution).  
 
Equals 1 if a right to collective bargaining is expressly granted by 
the constitution. 
 
Equals 0.67 if collective bargaining is described as a matter of 
public policy or public interest (or mentioned within the chapter 
on rights).   
 
Equals 0..33 if collective bargaining is otherwise mentioned in the 
constitution.   
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
27. Duty to bargain 
 
(0 during 1970-83, 0.5  thereafter) 
Equals 1 if employers have the legal duty to bargain and/or to 
reach an agreement with unions, works councils or other 
organizations of workers.   
 
Equals 0 if employers may lawfully refuse to bargain with 
workers.  
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
28. Extension of collective agreements 
 
(0.75 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the law extends collective agreements to third parties at 
the national or sectoral level. Extensions may be automatic, 
subject to governmental approval, or subject to a conciliation or 
arbitration procedure.   
 
Equals 0 if collective agreements may not be extended to non-
signatory workers or unions, or if collective agreements may be 
extended only at the plant level. Mandatory administrative 
extensions of collective agreements are coded as equivalent to 
mandatory extensions by law. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
29. Closed shops 
 
(0 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the law permits both pre-entry and post-entry closed 
shops. 
 
Equals 0.50 if pre-entry closed shops are prohibited or rendered 
ineffective but post-entry closed shops are permitted (subject in 
some cases to exceptions e.g. for pre-existing employees). 
 
Equals 0 if neither pre-entry or post-entry closed shops are 
 18
permitted to operate.  
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
30. Codetermination: board membership 
 
(0 –no change) 
Equals 1 if the law gives unions and/or workers to right to 
nominate board-level directors in companies of a certain size. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
31. Codetermination and information/consultation of 
workers 
 
(0 .33–no change) 
Equals 1 if works councils or enterprise committees have legal 
powers of co-decision making. 
 
Equals 0.67 if works councils or enterprise committees must be 
provided by law under certain conditions but do not have the 
power of co-decision making. 
 
Equals 0.5 if works councils or enterprise committees may be 
required by law unless the employer can point to alternative or 
pre-existing alternative arrangements. 
 
Equals 0.33 if the law provides for information and consultation of 
workers or worker representatives on certain matters but where 
there is no obligation to maintain a works council or enterprise 
committee as a standing body. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
  
E. Industrial action 
(0.48 during 1970-83;0.59 during 1985-97, 0.54 
thereafter) 
Measures the strength of protections for industrial action, 
measured as the average of variables 32-40. 
32. Unofficial industrial action 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if strikes are not unlawful merely by reason of being 
unofficial or ‘wildcat’ strikes. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
33. Political industrial action 
 
(0.5  during 1970-97, 0  thereafter) 
Equals 1 if strikes over political (i.e. non work-related) issues are 
permitted.   
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
34. Secondary industrial action 
 
(1 –no change) 
Equals 1 if there are no constraints on secondary or sympathy 
strike action. 
 
Equals 0.5 if secondary or sympathy action is permitted under 
certain conditions.   
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
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Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
35. Lockouts 
(0.5 –no change) 
Equals 1 if lockouts are not permitted. 
 
Equals 0 if they are. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
36. Right to industrial action 
 
(0 –no change) 
Measures the protection of the right to industrial action (i.e. strike, 
go-slow or work-to-rule) in the country's constitution or equivalent    
 
Equals 1 if a right to industrial action is expressly granted by the 
constitution 
 
Equals 0.67 if strikes are described as a matter of public policy or 
public interest. 
 
Equals 0.33 if strikes are otherwise mentioned in the constitution.  
 
Equals zero otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
37. Waiting period prior to industrial action 
 
(0.67 –no change) 
Equals 1 if by law there is no mandatory waiting period or 
notification requirement before strikes can occur. 
 
Equals 0 if there is such a requirement. 
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
38. Peace obligation 
(0.5 –no change) 
 
Equals 1 if a strike is not unlawful merely because there is a 
collective agreement in force. 
 
Equals 0 if such a strike is unlawful. 
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in the 
strength of the law. 
39. Compulsory conciliation or arbitration 
 
(0.67 –no change) 
Equals 1 if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures or other 
alternative-dispute-resolution mechanisms (other than binding 
arbitration) before the strike. 
 
Equals 0 if such procedures are mandated. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
40. Replacement of striking workers 
 
(0 during 1970-84, 1 thereafter) 
Equals 1 if the law prohibits employers to fire striking workers or 
to hire replacement labor to maintain the plant in operation during 
a non-violent and non-political strike.  
 
Equals 0 if they are not so prohibited. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 and 1 to reflect changes in 
the strength of the law. 
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Table 2. Labour Regulation, Employment and Industrial Production in India,  
1970-2006: Tests of Stationarity1 
 
Series2 
 
Level 
(with intercept 
and linear trend 
First difference 
(with intercept) 
First difference 
(with intercept 
and linear trend) 
Private Sector 
Employment  
-2.981758 (1) -4.137613 (0)*  
Registered 
Unemployment  
-2.047574 (0) -0.283508 (4) 
 
-6.249062 (0)* 
Real Industrial 
Output  
-3.258256 (1)  -4.624424 (0)* 
 
 
Labour Regulations  -1.930935 (0) 
 
-5.697512(0)* 
 
 
 
* The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 1 per cent level. In other cases it is 
not rejected even at 5 per cent level 
 
1 It is based on the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Lag length in parentheses 
selected on the basis of SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion).  
2 Excepting the labour regulation series, all the series are in natural log. 
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 Table 3.  Labour Regulation, Unemployment and Industrial Production in India, 
1970-2006:  Tests of Cointegration 
 
======================================================= 
 Selected* Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model
 
      
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
 
Trace 2 3 2 2 1 
Max- 
Eigenvalue 2 3 2 2 1 
      
      
* Based on 0.05 level critical values. 
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Table 4. Labour Regulation, Unemployment and Industrial Production in India, 
1970-2006:  Vector Error Correction Models 
 
 
Model I 
(Left hand 
Variable: 
LR ) 
 
 
Estimates 
 
Model II 
(Left hand 
Variable: 
LUN) 
 
 
Estimates 
 
 Model III 
(Left hand 
Variable: 
LIND) 
 
 
Estimates 
 
Long-run 
Relationship 
 
Long-run 
Relationship 
  
Long-run 
Relationship 
 
LUN 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.054884 
 
[-6.88399] 
 
 
LR 
 
 
 
 
 
-18.22028 
 
[-8.85517] 
 
 
 
LR 
 
20.74464 
  
[ 4.91776] 
 
 
LIND 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.048205 
  
[ 5.60176] 
 
LIND 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.878313 
 
[-7.42730] 
 
 
 
 
LUN 
 
 
-1.138547 
 
[-5.06894] 
 
 
Short-run 
Relationship 
 Short-run 
Relationship 
 Short-run 
Relationship 
 
Adjustment 
Coefficient, θ 
 
-0.484543 
  
[-4.97834] 
 
Adjustment 
Coefficient, θ 
 
 0.128764 
 
[ 3.56684] 
 
Adjustment 
Coefficient, θ 
 
-0.023723 
 
[-1.02473] 
 
 
∆LRt-1  
 0.092418 
  
[ 0.58305] 
 
∆UN
 t-1  
 0.218132 
  
[ 1.03972] 
 
 
∆LIND
 t-1  
 0.109202 
 
[ 0.63421] 
 
 
∆LRt-2  
 0.229964 
 
[ 1.52350] 
 
∆UNt-2  
-0.322875 
 
[-1.52298] 
 
∆LIND
 t-2  
-0.115572 
 
[-0.63785] 
 
 
∆UN
 t-1  
-0.083954 
 
∆LRt-1  
-0.211995 
 
∆LRt-1  
-0.470295 
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[-2.70431] 
 
[-0.19790] 
 
 
[-0.60132] 
 
 
∆UNt-2  
-0.050101 
 
[-1.59709] 
 
∆LRt-2  
 0.053584 
 
[ 0.05253] 
 
∆LRt-2  
1.965253 
 
[ 2.63868] 
 
 
 
∆LIND
 t-1  
 0.035904 
 
     [ 1.02887] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆LIND
 t-1  
 0.376042 
  
[ 1.59453] 
 
∆UN
 t-1  
0.045061 
 
[ 0.29417] 
 
 
∆LIND
 t-2 
 0.063855 
[ 1.73889] 
∆LIND
 t-2  
 0.250397 
 
[ 1.00899] 
 
∆UNt-2  
-0.412977 
  
[-2.66803] 
 
 
Constant,C 
 0.003330 
[ 1.07386] 
Constant,C  
 0.020078 
  
[ 0.95820] 
 
Constant,C  
 0.075959 
  
[ 4.96506] 
 
 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
 
 0.427470 
 
 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
 
 0.427276 
 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
 
 0.164582 
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Table 5. Labour Regulation, Unemployment and Industrial Production in India, 
1970-2006:  VEC Causality Analysis1 
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variables2 
Excluded 
Independent 
Variables1 Chi-square 
Degree 
of 
Freedom Probability 
Unemployment 
(LUN)     
 Industrial 
Production 
(LINDPRD)  3.767127 2  0.9801 
 Labour Regulation 
Index (LR)  0.040137 2  0.152 
Labour 
Regulation 
Index (LR)     
 Industrial 
Production 
(LINDPRD)  4.312412 2  0.1158 
 Unemployment 
(LUN)  14.3085* 2  0.0008 
Industrial 
Production 
(LINDPRD)     
 Labour Regulation 
Index (LR)  7.062344* 2  0.0293 
 Unemployment 
(LUN)  7.511676* 2  0.0234 
 
* Significant at 5 per cent level; no causality null hypothesis is rejected. 
1 The lag order of the test is 2. 
2 Except labour regulation index all variables are in natural log. VEC causality tests 
are done on the basis of first differences of the variables. 
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Figure 1: 
 
Labour Regulation Index in India and Four OECD Countries, 1970-2006 
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Figure 2: 
 
Indian Labour Regulations, 1970-2006: Different Components 
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Figure 3: 
 
Labour Regulation Relating to Dismissal in India and Four OECD Countries 
 
 
